This study investigates the empirical determinants of the treaty network of the 1860s and 1870s. It makes use of three central theories about the determinants of PTA formation, considering economic fundamentals from neoclassical and 'new' trade theory, political-economy variables, and international interaction due to trade diversion fears (dependence of later PTAs on former). These possible determinants are operationalized using a newly constructed dataset for bilateral cooperation and non-cooperation among 13 European Countries and the US. The results of logistic regression analysis show that the treaty network can be explained by a combination of 'pure' welfare-oriented economic theory with political economy and international interaction models.
Introduction
Did nineteenth-century commercial bilateralism make any economic sense?
At first glance, it presents a fascinating experience of decentralized liberalization. David Lazer states that the Anglo-French treaty of commerce of 1860 (the Cobden-Chevalier treaty) started a 'free trade epidemic' that infected the European continent and led to a 'swift break with centuries of protection'. 2 The virus, bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 3 that stipulated preferential tariffs and unconditional most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment, was disseminated in a contagion process in which outsiders aimed for equal treatment on insiders' markets, thereby causing further outsiders to be exposed to discrimination and the incentive to sign treaties. In a period of 15 years, this led to the conclusion of 56 similar PTAs in Europe, forming an authentic 'spaghetti bowl' (Figure 1 ) and liberalising trade to an extent that was internationally unmatched until the end of the GATT's Tokyo round.
At second glance, numerous problems were inherent in this decentralized system, most notably the increasing tendency after 1865 to sign MFN-only treaties, in which no further liberalization was achieved. This development can be seen as a moment of fading will to liberalize, especially due to the incentive to free-ride on the unconditional MFN clause, and sheds doubt on the sustainability of the system. 4 Recently, Accominotti and Flandreau have combined these institutional weaknesses with their finding that treaties were ineffective and concluded that they were intended to be so:
Liberalization was the cool thing to do and policymakers made a lot of noise to be noted (and su cceeded quite well). At the same time they may have avoided upsetting their constituenci es and managed to implement more or less meaningless liberalization efforts (again, well done). Par aphrasing Keynes, we conclude that later political scientists, economists, and economic historians, when writing enthusiastically about the Cobden-Chevalier treaty, have fallen prey to dead policymakers. 5 At a third glance, the conclusion by Accominotti and Flandreau does not follow from an investigation of the determinants of the treaties, but is deducted to explain the results of an econometric analysis of their effects. This analysis has been challenged as expecting something from the treaties that they were not intended to deliver, namely increases in overall 3 trade, while stipulations were commodity-specific and can be shown to have had positive commodity-specific effects. 6 Hence, it is time to have a systematic look at possible causes of the PTAs forming the 'spaghetti bowl' of the 1860s and 1870s. This will serve to assess if they were political and diplomatic theatre or motivated by meaningful determinants, either based on 'pure' economic theory or on political economy. The latter, among others, investigates the impact of interest groups behind the spread of the treaty network. The results of this historical case study also facilitate systematic comparison with presentday bi-and regionalism, which is one of the most important fields of recent research in international economics. That research, mostly theoretical, deals with PTA formation in the context of the slow advancement of the last GATT/WTO rounds. It generally models PTAs only in the context of Art. 24 GATT 9 and asks whether they are 'stepping stones' to multilateral integration or 'stumbling stones' and as such pernicious to world trade and world welfare. 10 As in the 1860s and 1870s multilateralism was not on the horizon (except for the Zollverein in the context of German unification), historical decision-makers could more freely decide on bilaterally optimal treaties, especially when it came to potentially discriminatory tariff reductions and exceptions for 'sensitive' domestic branches. This should be beneficiary for the results of the present study.
After this introduction, the three most relevant testable theoretical explications of the formation and spreading of PTAs are outlined. Then, the empirical setup for testing these theories and the dataset elaborated to conduct the tests are presented, followed by the empirical re- 6 Lampe, 'Effects'. 7 See appendix 4 and Bairoch, 'European trade policy ', and O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization, . 8 Lazer 'Free trade epidemic'; Pahre, Politics 9 Art. XXIV (8) GATT 1994 allows departure from MFN-treatment if a subset of countries forms a Customs Union or Free Trade Area, '…in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce… are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories'. I.e., such arrangements have to embrace practically all trade, and not only be 'preferential'. 10 For an overview of theories see Panagariya, 'Preferential trade liberalization'. Baldwin, 'Multilateralising regionalism', surveys the empirical aspects.
sults. Subsequently, these findings are interpreted in the light of theory and historical context.
The final section concludes.
What determines preferential trade agreements?
Economic theories of PTAs assume that both countries have to be potentially better off with the final agreement than without it. The two main theoretical schools, 'pure' international trade theory and political-economic theories, differ in whether governments base their decision-making entirely on welfare-maximization or take into account the contributions of interest groups for tariff-setting and international trade policy cooperation.
In neo-classical models, initially without physical or political barriers to trade, unilateral free trade leads to optimal domestic as well as world welfare outcomes because it allows international specialization following differences in technology or in factor endowments. Although free trade always leads to optimal world welfare, the introduction of different market sizes can lead to outcomes in which larger countries influence the world price. This gives them the possibility to set 'optimum tariffs' in order to improve domestic terms of trade and increase domestic welfare at the cost of other countries. A possible implication in a world of several large countries is that other countries might do the same (retaliation), and hence an inefficient Nash equilibrium is established in which all countries (also the small ones) are worse off than without tariffs. This 'prisoners' dilemma' can be overcome by cooperative agreements on reciprocal tariff reductions that leave the bilateral trade balance unchanged. If there are more than two countries, such bilateral tariff reductions may lead to trade diversion, i.e., an increase of trade between collaborating countries at the expense of others. In neoclassical models, trade diversion can lead to highly ambiguous outcomes concerning the welfare of both countries involved, but unambiguously bilateral 'preferential' agreements lead to lower world welfare than free trade. This is why they are, at most, 'second best' solutions.
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Including production with increasing returns to scale operating under monopolistic competition, and consumers' love of variety, it can be shown that PTAs may be concluded to ensure access to larger markets. This may make production cheaper and widen the range of product continental transport costs to account for the fact that geography plays an important effect in the formation of prevalently regional PTAs. Their model includes two factors of production and two monopolistically-competitive industries that produce with increasing returns to scale.
The decision to conclude a PTA is taken by social planners who maximize the welfare of their countries' representative consumer. 16 Baier's and Bergstrand's analysis yields seven hypotheses about factors influencing the net welfare gain from a PTA and the corresponding probability that it is concluded: First, it increases for countries that are located closer to each other (i.e., it decreases with higher transport costs). Second, it increases with the remoteness of the country pair from the rest of the 6 world for trading partners on the same continent. While the former accounts for the fact that integration becomes more attractive if transportation between markets is relatively cheap, the latter hypothesis models the opportunity costs and possible welfare losses from the bilateral PTA in question that are lower if all other countries are relatively far away.
Because economies of scale increase with market size, the third and forth hypothesis are that potential welfare gains increase if both countries are large and if the difference in their economic sizes is small, while the fifth hypothesis stats that it decreases if both countries are relatively small in comparison to the rest of the world (i.e., the national income of all other countries). In the context of the 1860s and 1870s, hypotheses 3 to 5 are questionable, as economies of scale might have been rather unimportant in the context of the first industrial revolution. Less controversial in our context, the model predicts, sixth, that due to gains from inter-industry specialization larger differences in the country pair's factor endowments increase the welfare gains from a PTA. However, and this is their seventh hypothesis, it decreases if the difference between both countries' factor endowments and those of the rest of the world are comparatively high, because welfare gains from inter-industry trade with the other countries are likely to exceed those of a PTA with the partner in question. Domestic political support, endogenous tariff formation, and PTAs. Pahre developed an empirically testable endogenous tariff and cooperation theory, which is mathematically simpler than the 'protection for sale' approach, but allows him to be much more comprehensive in stating and testing hypotheses. It does not build on the Baier-Bergstrand model, but might be combined with it argumentatively. The main virtue of this approach is that it was designed with nineteenth-century decentralized treaty making in mind. 17 The theory starts with explaining unilateral tariff-setting from a political support theory of policy-making, and then proceeds to hypothesize about the likeliness of international cooperation via trade agreements. At the domestic level, it involves the government and two economic sectors, import-competers and exporters. Sectors do not represent firms only, but include all individuals that either gain or lose from foreign trade, and hence constitute two opposing political forces. Importcompeters' incomes increase when domestic prices rise in comparison to world prices, while exporters' incomes decrease because they have to pay the domestic price for inputs and charge the world price. The government takes decisions in order to maximize political support from both sectors. Support is a positive function of each sector's income, but with diminishing returns. Governments can redistribute income by imposing positive unilateral tariffs that 7 raise domestic prices above world prices. Domestic forces interact with the world economy in a sense that changing world prices and tariffs in other countries affect domestic politics.
When assessing the likeliness of PTAs from Pahre's approach, one has to be aware that he focuses on the national level, i.e., his dependent variable is the 'cooperativeness' of a country with certain characteristics in comparison to others, not the county pair. Nevertheless, regarding the probability of trade agreements, we might conclude from his hypotheses: 18 First, lowtariff countries are more likely to cooperate in general, but if the other country has (initially) high-tariffs a PTA will be more stable than if it is a low-tariff country. 19 Second, regarding country size, Pahre's theory yields somewhat different outcomes than the model of economic fundamentals above. Pahre finds that at the domestic level, large countries have higher tariffs than smaller ones because they can manipulate world prices for their imports downwards through the effect of tariffs on domestic demand. 20 Although following this reasoning, small countries should be more cooperative because of their lower tariffs, they are less likely to sign trade treaties than large countries, because they have smaller markets and therefore are less attractive as 'targets' of PTAs. Although Pahre does not address this explicitly, his finding implies that the difference in market size should be the more relevant of the two economic fundamentals, since small countries might cooperate with small countries due to the relative lack of other partners, while larger ones prefer larger countries. 21
Additional considerations concerning historical factors lead Pahre to findings on fiscal constraints, i.e., whether tariff revenue was essential for the budget, and democratization:
Democracies are more likely to cooperate than autocratic states, and endogenous, i.e., weak, self-imposed and revocable fiscal constraints make treaties more likely, while exogenous, 'hard' fiscal constraints have a less clear-cut impact, which is surely less positive than that of endogenous constraints, and possibly negative. 22 Trade diversion and international interaction. A third aspect of the formation of the Cobden-Chevalier network, the trade diversion and fear of discrimination underway during the "general treaty-mongering all over Europe" 23 , can be covered using the 'domino theory of re- 18 Pahre, Politics, chs. 7-8. The summary given here skips the effects of changes in the terms of trade on 'cooperativeness' because it is difficult to frame for the country-pair and cannot be tested with the present dataset. 19 These hypotheses imply that if trade agreements are more stable they should also be more likely to be signed. 20 Baldwin. 24 It analyses the effects of regional integration on industries in non-member countries and subsequent political action by their governments. Again the model abstracts from economic fundamentals -all countries are symmetric -, but can be argumentatively combined with Baier-Bergstrand. As in Pahre's theory, the government also responds to the support of interest groups, but the theory does not focus on the domestic level, but on international interaction. In Baldwin's model, there are two types of interest groups, organized firms (exporters) and non-economic anti-cooperation lobbies. 25 Organized firms base their efforts on expected gains from PTAs, because their profits depend on transport costs which are lower for intra-PTA trade than for exports to non-members, between nonmembers and from non-members to PTA parties. This is most simply explained by low tariffs established by the PTA in comparison to the rest of the world. In Baldwin's original model, a
PTA can comprise an unlimited number of countries. The number of actual PTA members is determined by the size of contributions of non-economic interest groups which are modelled by Baldwin as marking the only difference between countries. If a 'trigger event' happens, i.e. a development inside the trade bloc that lowers relative intra-PTA trade costs (e.g., regulatory homogenization), firms in non-member countries suffer from increased relative costs and potential trade diversion, and hence increase their lobbying activities. Ceteris paribus, this will lead to accession of those countries whose non-economic anti-accession lobbies had just been big enough to impede accession before. The accession of at least one additional country increases the relative costs for exporting firms of remaining outsiders and make their accession more likely. In the end, a new equilibrium with an increased number of PTA members emerges. Unfortunately, multilateral PTA formation is not the subject of the present study.
However, in a later article Baldwin stated that if the multilateral PTA is a closed club, 'the new political economy flames may find vent in preferential agreements among excluded nations.' 26 We therefore might interpret the bilateral PTAs of the Cobden-Chevalier network as 'closed PTAs' with two members. The conclusion of one PTA then will lead to the conclusion of new PTAs if the markets in question are big enough that resulting discrimination affects outsider firms' profits. As they cannot become a party of, e.g., the Anglo-French treaty, they will try to form a new PTA with each of its parties to assure (and widen) market access under equal (or better) conditions. 24 Baldwin, 'Domino theory'. 25 Without going into detail, his approach is similar to the 'protection for sale' following Grossman and Helpman, 'Politics of free-trade agreements': The decision-maker has a fixed-weight linear objective function consisting of two components: welfare and contributions from interest groups. Contributions work like binding contracts. If decision-makers accept them, they will have to take into account the corresponding group's interest. 26 Baldwin, 'Causes of Regionalism ', p. 878. Cf. Yi, 'Endogenous formation', and Pahre, Politics, pp. 299-301.
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In subsequent work, Baldwin studies a situation where different country sizes and prevalently bilateral PTA formation are likely to lead to 'hub-and-spoke bilateralism' where small countries are highly interested in concluding bilateral treaties with bigger countries, but not so much among themselves. He develops an empirical measure of 'hubness', which is
, where s stands for share, X for exports, M for imports, i is the country that evaluates the PTA and j is the market in question, so that X ij s is the share of i's exports that goes to j and M ij s the share of i's imports that originate in j. Higher hubness of j is said to increase i's willingness to sign a bilateral PTA. 27 In a dynamic perspective, additionally, the share of i's imports from other markets already covered by an agreement should be of importance. Table 1 sums up the theoretical predictions (and in part the empirical findings) for the explanatory variables that can be derived from the mentioned theories. 28 Underlying data and ways of calculation are subjects of the next section. 
Empirical determinants of the Cobden-Chevalier network
Now, we turn to the empirical implementation of tests for the determinants of the PTA network of the 1860s and 1870s based on the theories outlined above. As all treaties of the network were bilateral, the natural level of analysis is the country-pair. The dataset includes all 13 countries visible in figure 1 plus the US, and in principle consists of 91 unique undirected dyads. 29 The dataset starts in 1857 and ends in 1875, and hence comprises 19 annual time-periods, of which only 18 are used because some variables are included with one-year lags (see below). The analysis aims to explain only unconditional MFN treaties that were signed and finally put in force between the countries in the sample, i.e. the treaties in figure 1 plus the Swiss-US PTA of 1855 are considered. 30 They are included for the year the treaty 27 Baldwin, Spoke trap, pp. 27-30. 28 Other potential determinants of trade flows can be found in the literature and have been included in preliminary versions of this article. As none of them showed significant coefficients, they are omitted here. 29 e.g., France-Spain and Spain-France constitute one observation only. 30 Other treaties with non-European countries seem to have been concluded without too much consideration: 'In February, 1864, following the fashion at that time, a commercial treaty was concluded with Japan, and one afternoon Sir John Bowring, an old friend of Switzerland, visited Berne as an extraordinary minister of the king of the Hawaii Islands, Kamehameha V, to advance the Swiss-Honolulu relationships through the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, settlement and commerce (20 July 1864). ' was signed, not for the year it entered into force. 31 All observations of '1' for a dyad after the year of signing of a bilateral treaty are dropped from the sample, as they are not independent since treaties had a stipulated minimum duration of 10 to 12 years. This implies that for country-pairs with an unconditional MFN-PTA in force before 1857, i.e. Austria-Hungary and the Zollverein (1853) and Switzerland and the US (1855), all observations are dropped before estimating. 32 As the network evolved in Europe, the main analysis focuses on the 13 European countries of the sample (77 dyads), and the US is additionally included for robustness checks.
The estimations therefore are made with 985 and 1201 observations, respectively, instead of the theoretical maximum of 1638.
The dataset includes all economic fundamentals from Baier and Bergstrand enumerated in Table 1 . These are the distance-related variables Natural and Remote, as well as the sum (GDPs) and difference (dGDP) of economic sizes, and the bilateral difference in factor endowments and country-pair's relative factor endowments in comparison to the countries not part of the dyad in question. 33 Because the US is the only non-European country in the dataset, the variable Remote is problematic for our analysis, as it is an interaction term between a distance-related measure and a 'same continent' dummy. It is therefore not included in the basic model, and only included in the robustness check with the US-inclusive sample, and afterwards excluded, because it is highly correlated with Natural (the inverse of bilateral distance). Due to the lack of comprehensive capital stock data for the 1860s and 1870s, landlabour ratios were constructed instead, i.e., hectares of cultivated area per person in the economically active population. This coincides with Ronald Rogowski's argument that landlabour ratios inform sufficiently about the position of workers in the late nineteenth century in commercial policy matters. 34 Therefore, the difference of both countries' land-labour ratios (dLLR) and the average difference of both countries' land-labour ratios from those of to the rest of the world (dLLRRow) substitute the original variables for capital and labour (dKLR and dKLRow). National income data are purchasing power parity adjusted 'real' GDP data in Baier's and Bergstrand's original article, while the present analysis uses historical national 31 Observations on the latter are likely distorted by formalities, e.g., treaties concluded by the Zollverein with all countries except Austria would enter into force only after the expiration of the February treaty of 1853 in 1865. 32 As none of the treaties was effectively denounced during the period under study, there is no switch back to the non-treaty state. Therefore, signing a PTA can be treated as an 'absorbing event'. 33 See app. 1 for the formulas.
accounting reconstructions of nominal GDP. 35 These data as well as geographical distances are from the same sources as in Lampe's gravity estimates; land-labour ratios have been calculated from the data compiled by B.R. Mitchell. 36 To deal with endogeneity, all variables mentioned so far are included with their 1857 values only. This can be interpreted as governments having formed a picture about the other markets and their characteristics in that year which was not updated during the negotiation wave of the Cobden-Chevalier network. Given the sparse historical records and the absence of contemporary national accounting, this seems to fit the negotiators' state of information.
Technically, this implies that 'instantaneous' data are treated as 'enduring' in the analysis, which as a consequence is based on cross-dyad differences for the variables in question only.
This should not be too problematic, because differential increases in incomes or changes in factor endowments are unlikely to have caused the formation of the Cobden-Chevalier network. 37 However, the question whether 1857 was a 'typical year' merits discussion, given the accounts of a great commercial crisis in that year. However, what is essential for the present research is that economic fundamentals and trade shares were not atypical in that year. Since the pace of structural change is generally much slower than the business cycle fluctuations, we can suppose that this was the case. Referring to trade shares, the geographical distribution of import shares for six important European countries in 1857 is highly correlated with that of 1859 and the average of the years 1857-75. 38 Furthermore, the variables from Pahre's domestic political economy-based approach as well as from the Baldwin-based international interaction theory are framed for individual countries, not for dyads. Since it takes both parties' positive judgement to conclude a bilateral agreement, I generally use the bilateral maximum or minimum of a variable, making the choice dependent which implies clearer constraints or incentives to treaty-making. E.g., because autocratic countries are predicted to be less cooperative, I use the bilateral minimum of 12 the democracy score, as also done in any political science studies. For details concerning other variables, see below. 39 To test Pahre's predictions, four variables were constructed: Autonomous bilateral tariffs, Endogenous fiscal constraints, Exogenous fiscal constraints, and a democracy variable called
Polity2. The impact of country sizes is subsumed under the sum and difference of national income variables of the Baier-Bergstrand setting. Autonomous bilateral tariffs, i.e., the tariff rates applied to commodities from non-PTA countries (in contrast to preferential rates stipulated in PTAs), have been calculated from the national tariff laws based on the 21 commodity groups of Lampe's dataset and classification (see appendix 2). For the analysis, the resulting commodity-group specific ad valorem rates for each country have been weighted individually with each partner country's export structure (in 1865) to model the importance of every country's tariffs to every single partner's export structure. The maximum and the minimum of both countries' bilateral average tariffs are included in the regressions, since the prediction from Pahre's model can either be that low tariffs or that high tariffs induce cooperation. 14 Estimations start with the economic fundamentals model which is then gradually extended by including first the domestic political economy and then the international interaction variables. The basic analysis is done for the European members of the Cobden-Chevalier network. As the US is the only geographical outsider in the dataset and additionally was also an outsider to the treaty-network -it did not conclude any treaties between 1857 and 1875 -for which reliable data could be constructed the same models are re-estimated with the USinclusive dyads for robustness checks. The variable Remote is only included in the latter specification. The results are shown in Table 2 for the core sample and in Table 3 for all countries including the US.
All economic fundamentals coefficients are signed as expected. At the 10 per cent level, all variables except the average land-labour ratios relative to the rest of the world (dLLRRow) and the common market size indicator (GDPs) are statistically significant for the core sample.
In some specifications, the bilateral difference in land-labour ratios (dLLR) does also hits the hurdle by a small margin. The smallness and statistical insignificance of the coefficient for dLLRRow might be explained by the relatively low variation across countries: all were relatively high developed in comparison to the rest of the world. Additionally, dLLRRow and GDPs are highly correlated and disturb each other's estimates. dLLRRow is therefore dropped from the subsequent estimates, as is Remote, because it is highly (negatively) correlated with
Natural. The estimation of the reduced basic model now provides a much more precise estimate for GDPs, while the results for the remaining economic fundamentals are stable across all variations. A country-pair whose members are closer to each other (Natural), have a potentially large 'common market' (GDPs) and different factor endowments (dLLR) is more likely to conclude a PTA, while higher GDP differences (dGDP) make PTAs less likely (presumably to the disadvantage of smaller countries). When adding additional variables to the models, correlation between right-hand side variables leads to imprecise estimates for coefficients and standard errors of GDPs, which are unsatisfactorily from a theoretical point of view and statistically troubling. This refers especially to the inclusion of fiscal constraint dummies and of hubness. 47 With the exception of the endogenous fiscal constraint dummy, none of these vari-Following Mansfield and Reinhardt, 'Multilateral determinants', some political scientists use a variable called PTA density to capture the influence of PTAs concluded by other than the two countries of a dyad. Unfortunately, for the present dataset, 'PTA density' is highly correlated with the linear time trend (Pearson's r=0.97).
Although an interesting candidate to proxy for 'contagion', this variable was not included in the regressions. 47 Hubness is theoretically related to GDPs because it is modeled with market size in mind.
In the extended sample the estimate for GDPs and for dLLR is also sensitive to the inclusion of PTA Coverage.
A possible explication includes a combination for two factors: First, the US had the highest national income and the second highest land-labour ratio of all countries in the sample, but did not conclude any MFN-PTAs during the observation period due to domestic reasons potentially missing in the model. This works against the economic fundamentals. Additionally, the US had in force (until 1866) a non-unconditional MFN-PTA with British 15 ables shows statistically significant results. The endogenous fiscal constraint dummy causes problems because 57 per cent of all observations have at least one country with a 'weak fiscal constraint' involved, and hence the dummy is likely to capture effects not related to fiscal constraints. 48 Both fiscal constraint dummies and Hubness are therefore removed from the favoured specifications, where the effects of national income remain as described. Table 2 here Table 3 here
The remaining domestic political economy variables perform well: The less autocratic the country with the lower Polity2-score (MinPolity2-1), the more likely is international collaboration in commercial policy. This is in line with Pahre's findings. Furthermore, the inclusion of Polity leads to a higher and more precisely estimated coefficient for the dLLR variable. The difference in land-labour ratios is weakly correlated (r=0.07) to the MinPolity2 -1 score and even more correlated with a polity ratio (MaxPolity2-1/MinPolity2-1; r=0.30). This indicates that countries with wide differences in the land-labour ratio also differ in their degree of relative democracy and autocracy. While the former variable indicates welfare gains from trade, the difference in the degree of autocracy and the degree of autocracy itself are negatively related to the conclusion of PTAs, statistically as well as theoretically (see above). Hence, in the initial estimate, dLLR captures partially an effect that is isolated by including the Polity-score.
The consistently significant and positive coefficients for bilateral autonomous tariffs indicate that higher autonomous tariffs make (partner) collaboration more likely. The estimates are finally made with the bilateral maximum (MaxTariff -1 ) because of the slightly higher explanatory power of the model including this formulation for the core sample. 49 These findings partially contradict Pahre's theory that countries with lower tariffs are more collaborative, but on the other hand sustains that high partner tariffs make collaboration more likely.
Regarding the third group of variables, those concerning international interaction, the hubness variable does not perform well. Neither its minimum nor its maximum show significant results in the analysis. 50 Thus, Hubness does not systematically model forces at work in the formation of the Cobden-Chevalier network. 51
North America, which was coded in PTA Coverage because trade with British North America was included in the sample. One might expect a considerably discriminatory effect of this PTA, but in effect this was not the case because it covered only bilateral trade in raw materials which the US did normally not import from Europe. 48 Consistent with expectations from Pahre's theory, the coefficient for the endogenous fiscal constraint dummy is positive. It is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The exogenous constraint dummy has the value of '1' for 68 per cent of all observations, even more than the endogenous constraint proxy. 49 For the extended sample the contrary is true. The reason is that the US has the higher tariff rate in the majority of country-pairs it forms part of, but concluded no treaties. 50 At first sight, the results for hubness calculated with perceived trade in the extended sample seem to back hu bness as a substantial determinant of PTAs. Nevertheless, the statistical significance of the effects is spurious and
In contrast, the coefficient of the maximum of the discrimination proxy Trade partner PTA coverage (i.e, MaxPartnercovered -1 ) is positive and significant throughout. This means that potential trade diversion played an important role in the formation of the network, and that countries became more attractive 'targets' for the formation of PTAs, the more PTAs they had already concluded.
Interpretation of the results
The empirical analysis has shown that all three classes of theories contribute valuable in- The economic fundamentals, which model the welfare expectations from PTAs, have to form the basis of every interpretation of the Cobden-Chevalier network and account for the major part of the goodness of fit. Their significant and theoretically consistent coefficients results from suppressor effects, as can be seen when the minimum and the maximum of hubness are included individually, or when economic fundamentals, Pahre's variables and the time effects are dropped from the model. Coefficients are insignificant in all these estimates, and sometimes show signs opposite to those in Table 3 . 51 This contradicts results of Holmes, 'What drives regional trade agreements that work?', working paper (2005), who used bilateral export shares (a simplification of hubness), and found their bilateral minimum to be positively and significantly related to the formation of 'effective' PTAs in force in 2002. However, her models only include 'distance' as an economic fundamental. 52 The goodness of fit of the models is reasonable, but far from the 0.7 obtained by Baier and Bergstrand, 'Economic determinants' with data for 1996 for the economic fundamentals alone. This most likely is due to the small sample size and the relatively low variation in the dataset, as the observations are clustered in the core of the world economy. The goodness of fit is however not too far below that obtained by Mansfield will be balanced and free from externalities, and hence the size of the partner will not be important. Nevertheless, it becomes important after realistically introducing PTA negotiation costs into the political support function, i.e., costs of consultation of domestic parliamentary bodies, export commissions and interest groups. If we reasonably assume that a considerable part of these costs is fixed, then they affect the net benefits of PTAs with small countries more than those with large countries. This is especially true in combination with expectations that preferences will be transmitted to other, larger countries (and their exporters) via MFN, causes PTAs with big countries to be comparatively more attractive, especially for larger countries. 55 Hence, it is not surprising that the present results suggest and the historical evidence shows that large countries were more likely to negotiate first among each other, and only subsequently (if at all) with smaller countries. Additionally, small countries found themselves in a disadvantageous situation of having to 'accede' to the state of negotiation established by the bigger countries and only being able to bargain on issues not covered by the initial treaties. 56 54 Baier and Bergstrand, 'Economic determinants'. 55 See Horn and Mavroidis, 'Economic and legal aspects', for a deeper review of the literature. 56 Consider, e.g. the remarks of French Foreign Minister Drouyn at the beginning of the Franco-Swiss negotiations that it was not the purpose of the current negotiations to touch the preferences it had made in its prior PTAs with the UK and Belgium. These would be transmitted to Switzerland, but French concessions would be limited
Turning to the genuinely political economy variables, the level of democracy (or the relative absence of autocracy) has significantly positive impact in all specifications. This confirms theories that highlight the positive correlation of wider suffrage and political cooperation, as well as Pahre's empirical findings. Furthermore, an additional interaction between political and economic determinants could be uncovered. Differences in land-labour ratios and in relative democracy are correlated, but show adverse signs as determinants of PTAs: While the former indicate gains from specialisation, the latter show that countries with a higher degree of autocracy are more difficult to cooperate with. Only disentangling both effects shows that each of them has a consistent influence on the formation of PTAs.
At first sight, the present findings on tariffs are contradictory to those of Pahre, who finds that countries with lower tariffs are more cooperative. Nevertheless, if we see tariffs not as 'political fundamentals', but as something that can be manipulated through international interaction, we are able to discover their strategic importance. This does not necessarily imply that tariffs were chosen at the domestic level to improve the home government's bargaining position. It simply means that high duties -however they were motivated when imposedconstituted political barriers to trade whose removal would lead to better market access for partner countries' exporters. 57 The positively signed bilateral tariffs coefficient therefore shows that political barriers to trade (like the physical barriers to trade proxied by Natural and The results for the individual variables can be joined into a general interpretation of nineteenth-century bilateralism. Especially, the strategic interaction patterns behind the results for Partner PTA coverage and Autonomous bilateral tariffs indicate that the potential of expanto items not included in these treaties (Brand, .
The French government unlikely would have undertaken the large industrial enquête it conducted in the context of the Cobden-Chevalier treaty (Dunham, Anglo-French treaty, ch. 7) for a treaty with Switzerland. 57 Pahre's results can be found in Politics. Strategic tariff-setting occurred after 1880, when two-tier tariffs became common in Europe, establishing retaliatory duties for non-cooperative partners to force them to cooperate. This should be interpreted in the light of the problems of free riding discussed below. 58 This is found despite the inclusion of time-dependent control variables. 59 Egger and Larch, 'Interdependent preferential trade agreement memberships'; Manger, 'The political economy of discrimination: modelling the spread of preferential trade agreements ', mimeo (2006) ; Baldwin and Jaimovich, 'Are free trade agreements contagious?, working paper (2009), sion and the sustainability of the network were affected by the same forces that led to its expansion:
First, the combination of a positive influence of Partner PTA coverage and Natural (corresponding to a negative influence of distance) explains why the network was geographically constricted to Europe, and was unable not expand after the inclusion of all European coun- This is not surprising considering Ethier's theory on 'MFN in a multilateral world'. 61 In his models, the unconditional MFN clause diminishes incentives to agree on preferential tariff reductions as the network of PTAs gets larger, because of two mechanisms in the political support functions: First, governments give negative weight to the fact that with more countries in the network additional bilateral preferences have to be shared with more countries, and thus are less exclusive for domestic exporters. Second, additional preferences granted to foreign exporters become more costly because they have to be transmitted to more countries via MFN. These resulting externalities lead to incentives for free-riding and evasion of further bilateral liberalization. This precisely is what could be observed in the decades after 1875, when the Cobden-Chevalier network did not collapse, but did also not advance further on the way to free trade. 62 Ethier stresses that the only feasible way to internalize such externalities lies in 60 Even the sustainability of the negotiated tariff reductions was uncertain, given the stipulated limited durations of 10n to 12 years with a one-year term of notice afterwards. 61 20 the multilateralization of negotiations. 63 However, the scope for formal multilateralism was too small in the historical context of the present study. The importance of potential trade diversion and high tariffs highlighted above indicates that it would have taken very strong political determination to multilateralize the network. This seems to have been rather unlikely in the age of 'struggle for colonies' and arms races among European powers that characterized international relations before the First World War. 64
Conclusion
The research presented in the preceding sections strongly suggests that systematic economic as well as political forces were at work in the formation of the bilateral treaties of the 1860s and 1870s. Unless we assume that all contemporary policymakers fell victim to each other in their decision-making or joined a large conspiracy, we can conclude that for them, ex ante the PTAs of the Cobden-Chevalier network made sense (at least on average).
The results offer new insights into the forces behind the treaties. 'Pure' welfare-oriented economic theory combined with political economy and international interaction models show that trade-creation considerations interacted with strategically oriented political-economy forces to explain why the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 did not remain a singular phenomenon. These insights make also clear that the driving forces behind the expansion of the network at the same time limited its geographical extension and prevented the deepening of integration.
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Appendix 2: Calculation of ad valorem equivalents of autonomous tariffs
As most of the original tariffs were specific, e.g., in French Francs per 100kg, they had to be converted into ad valorem equivalents to be comparable and summarizable across the 21 commodity groups constituted for Lampe's dataset. 66 As most commodity groups consisted of more than one item, and tariff schemes varied from country to country, the rates from national tariff schemes first were mapped on the French scheme, which was the most systematic among the more detailed ones available and additionally enabled using the detailed import prices of French trade statistics to calculate the ad valorem equivalents. For each country, the duties corresponding to each item of the French scheme in every year between 1857 and 1875 were collected from national tariff laws, decrees, orders and circulars as reported in Preußisches Handelsarchiv, the Prussian official commercial periodical, and Annales du Commerce Extérieur, the French recompilation of consular reports. Information was crosschecked with contemporary compilations by Otto Hübner and H. Reader Lack. 67 1865 prices from the French import statistics were then extrapolated into current prices using commodity-group specific 'inflators' calculated from the average prices in Hamburg's trade statistics (which were too summarized to be used for the valuation of individual items).
To avoid biases resulting from the French structure, inside each commodity-group individual items were weighted based on French, British and Belgian import and export statistics. 68 66 Lampe, 'Bilateral trade flows', app. 1. 67 Hübner, Zolltarife and Zolltarife 2 nd edition; Lack, French Treaty. 68 For full titles of the trade statistics of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Hamburg, the Netherlands, the Unit-Given the different elasticities of substitution, import prohibitions have not been substituted by a general equivalent of, say, 100 per cent for all items, but enter the calculations as 1.5 times the highest tariff rate found for the item in question in other countries. E.g., import prohibitions of wheat in Spain were treated as a duty of approx. 19 per cent (1.5 times that of Portugal in 1865) and those for dyed percale and calico in France as 118 per cent (based on the Portuguese equivalent in 1857). As in Lampe's work, rates for spirits and liqueurs have been corrected for domestic excises. 69 For Austria-Hungary, Germany, the US, the UK and the Netherlands the autonomous tariff rates were calculated for each commodity group based on their customs revenue and imports statistics, as theses statistics reported items subject to preferential and non-preferential rates separately or both were the same due to generalisation of preferences. Pahre, Politics. 79 The standard reference in this context is Iliasu, 'Cobden-Chevalier commercial treaty'. See also Ratcliffe, 'Napoleon', and Wendt, 'Freihandel', Under the constitution of 1852, Napoleon III could grant preferential tariff reductions via PTAs without par-Given this, the treaty offered the possibility to pursue commercial aims, mainly lower tar- in order to retain political supremacy in Germany. To make this feasible, the Austrian government had adopted a series of tariff reductions in the early 1850s. In the February treaty of 1853, Austria and the Zollverein had taken a special appointment that stipulated a broad range of exclusive mutual preferential tariffs and assured Austria that talks about its accession to the Zollverein would be held in 1860. Since then, the Prussian government, which favoured a 'Smaller German Solution', i.e., German integration without Austria, had repeatedly presented initiatives to reduce the Zollverein's tariffs even more, hoping that Austria would not be able to follow for economic reasons. These proposals had consistently been blocked by Austria-friendly and more protectionist Zollverein members from Southern Germany. 87 Therefore, to Prussia the French proposal for negotiation of a bilateral PTA that was presented three days after the signature of the Cobden-Chevalier treaty not only offered the chance to overcome French discrimination against German exporters resulting from French preferences for British products, to put an end to repeatedly failed negotiations to reduce more than two decade-old retaliatory tariffs, and to negotiate additional preferences for German exporters. It also allowed creating an all-or-nothing situation that exposed the protectionist members of the Zollverein to the alternatives of a Prussia-led Zollverein with lower tariffs and a commercial treaty with France or dissolution of the Zollverein which would leave the benefits of the treaty to Prussia (and its followers) only. The proposed unconditional MFN clause 86 Britain, in change, lowered its tariffs unilaterally for all countries, thereby insisting on non-discrimination. 87 Fears of adverse trade diversion on large neighbouring markets neighbours drew Switzerland into the network. As a small country in which export industries had been able to establish themselves as one of the pillars of national self-perception, commercial matters were important in Swiss politics. After 1861, the Anglo-French and Franco-Belgian PTAs gave special treatment to third-country exporters on especially the French market. Advancing Franco-Prussian negotiations threatened to do the same for the Zollverein. 93 Unfortunately, Switzerland had low tariffs, a relatively small market and a quite complicated system of decision Sources: see text 98 Excluded from econometric analysis by Baier and Bergstrand because the economic size of the rest of the world was very similar across countries, and hence the difference showed a very small degree of variation. 99 From the 'target' perspective: Negative for small countries, positive for big countries. (p -value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
(p -value) Natural (p-value)
(p -value)
(p-value) Natural 1.09 (0.000) 1.28 (0.000) 1.50 (0.000) 1.50 (0.000) 1.50 (0.000) 1.53 (0.000) 1.56 (0.000) 1.58 ( 
